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Diane D. Blair Papers (MC 1632)

1992 Clinton Presidential Campaign Interviews

Interview with Craig T. Smith

Campaign Positions: National Finance Director; Manager, Super Tuesday;
Director of State Operations

Little Rock, Arkansas

October 22, 1992

Overview

Diane D. Blair was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, when she took a leave of absence to serve as a senior researcher in Governor Bill Clinton's presidential campaign. Approximately one month before the November election, Blair obtained permission from the governor to conduct interviews with participants in the Clinton/Gore campaign. In her own words, ". . . I had two major purposes in mind: first, simply to preserve for posterity an accomplished campaign organization that would essentially disappear on election day; and second, through discussions with campaign workers from all departments, to see what those on the inside believed to be the key ingredients of the campaign's success." She prepared a list of questions and began interviewing people as schedules allowed.

After Blair's death in 2000, her husband, Jim Blair, donated her personal and professional papers to Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries. Craig T. Smith reviewed this transcript and granted permission to make this interview available to scholars, students, and researchers. The final document may contain edits requested by the interviewee. This transcript was processed as part of the Diane D. Blair Papers and prepared for publication by the editorial staff of the David and Barbara Pryor Center for Arkansas Oral and Visual History.

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[Beginning of Interview]

Diane Blair: Craig, you've been an indispensable part of the campaign from the very beginning. What is your position with the campaign?

Craig Smith: My technical title is director of state operations. I oversee in-state politics, in-state field activities, in-state press, get-out-the-vote activities. And then work with David Wilhelm and others on targeting allocation of resources—which states get money, which states get candidate visits, and then to a lesser extent, which states get television, paid media.

DB: What were you doing before the campaign started?

CS: I worked for Clinton for five and a half years. I did the appointments to boards of commissions and I also did some legal work. I analyzed polling information for him. I was his liaison to the DLC, the Democratic Governors Association, the DNC, the State Democratic Party, lobbied the legislature.

DB: Sort of his top political officer?

CS: Yes. I did most of his politics, one way or another.

DB: So when the campaign started, what was your role—formal, informal, whatever?

CS: I was the first employee of the campaign. And at the time . . .

DB: And that was when?

CS: I technically went to work for the campaign August 25, 1991. After he gave the DLC speech in Ohio, he came under a tremendous amount of pressure to run from people all over the country. You know, “Bill, you’ve got to do this.”

DB: And who wrote that speech?

CS: He did. I mean, he locked himself in his office. You know, if you've ever been in his office, he rarely shuts the door, but he sat in his office for two days with the door shut writing this speech. So after that speech a lot of people called and said, "Clinton, you ought to do this." He came under a lot of pressure. You've got to go back to the decision in 1990 to run. At the time I was telling him, "Don't run for reelection, gear up for president." And I'd been taking that position since about right after the 1988 election. He considered it, I don't know how seriously, and then he decided, he agonized over whether or not to run in 1990 and then eventually decided to do it. And at that point he had basically put running for president out of his mind. He wasn't going to do it. Then after the DLC speech he came under all this pressure to reconsider that decision. So we met like in June at a preliminary meeting.

DB: Who was there?

CS: Well, first there was a series of individual conversations. You know, I would talk to him, I would talk to Bruce, Bruce would talk to him. Betsey would talk to him. I mean, we all just kind of hemmed and hawed around about it. In June, I think it was in late June, we had a meeting with—well, it was actually two meetings. One was in Boston that had Al From, Elaine Karmarck, myself, the governor. We sat around and talked about this—logistically how do you do this? I mean, what are the drop dead-dates? When do you have to decide? How do you get on ballots? What is the dynamic of this thing if you decided to do it?

DB: So who was answering those questions?

CS: Elaine Karmarck, who was the . . .

DB: She's with Progressive Politics Institute?

CS: That's what she's with now. But she did delegate selection for Bruce Babbitt in 1988, and she did delegate selection for Mondale in 1984. So she knew the time line. At the time we were still trying to answer the question, if we wanted to do this, by what time do we have to decide? She was able to come in and say, "Okay, here are the kind of deadlines you've got. And here's the dynamic of a calendar. If you wanted to win it, you'd have to win here, you'd have to finish second here, you know, you'd have to create this momentum." So she laid that all out to us, so we had that information. Then in July sometime we basically sat down and it was a meeting with Mark Gearan, Frank Greer, Stan Greenberg, Gloria Cabe, Bruce, myself, David Watkins, the governor and Hillary, to talk about, okay, if we wanted to do this—and at the time it was still a big if—if we wanted to do this, what's our kind of drop-dead date? At the time we decided August 12—if you're going to do it, you've got to form an exploratory committee by August 12—because you can't raise enough money to be taken seriously, et cetera, et cetera, after that. And this was in mid-July, so we talked about it. And that's when there were a lot of personal discussions. He'd call on Saturday morning, "Get Rutherford, come over to the mansion, call Bruce." And we'd sit over there and talk for about an hour. "Do we do this, do we not do this?" I mean, it was this kind of angst going on. Hillary would be there, asking, "How do you do it, can you really win, do you really want to win? Do you want to finish second in the primary and set yourself up for 1996? Who else is getting in, who's not getting in?"

DB: And at that time, of course, Bush was looking good.

CS: Oh, yes, he was 85 percent. He'd just won the war.

DB: It was more of a positioning race at that point?

CS: That's the way we were considering it. At the same time we saw the dynamic developing that Gephardt was getting out. Gore was getting out. All these people that we thought would be our most serious—if we got in—who we'd really have to fight with. They're all saying, "I'm not going to do this." So the field was opening up. I mean, there was a niche there for us to get into it, so we talked about it and talked about it, then we saw this kind of unofficial August 12 deadline. August 12 comes. We're waiting for the decision. I'm down there in the governor's main suite. And Gloria walks out of the governor's office and says, "You've got to go talk to him, he's not going to do this." I said, "Okay." So I walked in and I said, "Gov, what are you going to do?" He said, "I just don't think right now I'm ready to decide this and I think even though today was the date we set as a deadline, we're not going to do anything on it today." He said, "We've got more time than they actually said we had time." I said, "Look, there's been some press speculation that you're going to do this."

DB: One thing he couldn't do was back out?

CS: That's right. What I told him is, I said, "Look, let me just make two points before you make that decision. You've come to the brink twice. If you back out of this and you want to run in 1996, you'll never be credible. So if you're going to ever do it, if you ever want to do it in your life, you've got to do it now. If you ever want to run for president, now's the time. Don't think you can back out of this and then be taken seriously in 1996. You won't." He said, "How do I deal with this whole thing about telling people of the state that I'd stay?" I said, "Look, I think using an exploratory

committee is a good vehicle to do that because what you're going to say is, 'I've got to consider my options here. I need to talk to the people of Arkansas.' An exploratory committee is the vehicle with which you do that. You raise some money, you check out with people, you make a few trips. Travel around the state and see what they say." So he sat there for a little while. He said, "Do you really think that would work?" I said, "I do. What I think you can do is raise some money with the exploratory committee, run a poll and see if the people of Arkansas want you to stay as governor or if they want you to do this." At the time we were getting a lot of pressure from people in Arkansas to run. He sat there. He said, "Okay, you call Bruce and I'll call Hillary." And I said, "What do I tell Bruce?" He said, "You tell Bruce to get down here." I said, "Are you going to do this?" He said, "Why not?" So I got on the phone and I called Bruce and I said, "Bruce, you need to come down to the governor's office." He said, "Why?" "Because we're going to do this exploratory committee thing." "No, no, I talked to him this morning, he said he wasn't going to do it." "I know, Bruce, I talked to him, he's going to do it." "Is that what he just said?" "Yes, he told me to call you and tell you to come down here." He's on the other phone calling Hillary . . . "Hillary, I think I'm going to go ahead and do this." She had been wanting him to do this, you know. So it was easy for her. So after we made those calls, we called Al From and said, "We're issuing a statement now resigning from the DLC because we want to at least have twenty-four hours lag time before we start the committee and our resignation." But we knew once we resigned from the DLC, everyone would know what that meant. So we went ahead and I think Kiki Moore typed up—Kiki Moore and Gauldin got together

and typed up a statement and faxed it in to us. And they'd probably had it drafted for three weeks waiting for this to occur. They sent it in and he issued it later on that morning. Shortly thereafter Bob Farmer said, "Clinton, if you want to do this, I'll resign from the DNC as finance chairman and raise your money for you." So then we brought Farmer down here and announced he was going to raise our money. Well, Farmer's got a guy down here, Matt Gorman, who was down here poking around but he couldn't raise any money because we hadn't made a final decision. So Farmer comes down here and we did a press conference announcing him. Apparently he goes to Clinton and says, "I want Craig Smith to be my finance chairman," and they worked out some kind of a deal—not finance chairman, finance director. So I go pick up Farmer and we bring him in here and we do the press conference. And Farmer, in the middle of one of these press conferences, announces that I've been hired by the campaign to be the national finance director. He had talked to me about it, but I didn't think it was a done deal.

DB: You hadn't resigned from the state yet?

CS: No. But I quickly did. I quickly did. I announced my resignation from the state and went over there.

DB: So you were the first employee?

CS: That's right. Then Farmer blows town, so I'm left with it. So we get with Sarge and Watkins, then we rent the paint store and get the phones turned on and that's how we got it started.

DB: Which is where the last gubernatorial?

CS: Yes, that was the last gubernatorial race headquarters.

DB: Now it all began?

CS: Yes. I spent my first day down there sweeping the floors and getting Sarge's truck and driving over and picking up furniture.

DB: So you started as finance director and then you became?

CS: Then I moved in November to be in charge of Super Tuesday—to take over the south because of the Florida straw poll and because we were the only southerner in the race, the expectations were so high, and the Florida straw poll was in mid-December. The south became problematic very quickly, so we had to do something about it. Harkin was already there organizing. Jerry was already there organizing. Wilder was already there organizing. So they came to me and said, “Look, we appreciate the job you've done raising money, but your highest and best use to the campaign would be to do southern politics for us. We have a crisis in Florida.” I didn't really want to do it. I wanted to raise money.

DB: That surprises me, Craig. Now, looking back over everything, what made this campaign so effective?

CS: I think part of the reason it worked, my personal opinion was, in 1988 people voted for George Bush because of "Read my Lips" and Willie Horton. But he lied about “Read my lips,” and I think they felt like they got snookered. “We voted for this guy. He never told us what he was going to do. And you know what? He didn't do anything. And look what happened.” So I think there was a huge kind of feeling on the part of the American people that “We're not going to get snookered again.” You know, clip me once, shame on you, clip me twice, shame on me. And they wanted

to know what you were going to do. I mean, they felt like they got cheated. That's right. They got cheated. And they did get cheated in 1988.

DB: But beyond that, surely you want to give your field operations great credit. Everybody now knows that our GOTV means “Get on television,” but how does that work?

CS: What happens is when you send people out there and you tell them to get on television every day, they like that. So for the first two weeks they can come up with creative things to get on TV. We're opening the headquarters, we're cutting the ribbon, you're a novelty in town. After that, you're not a novelty any more, and you've got to have something. So when we go to the states and say, “Push college issues these days,” they'd say, “Great, it gives me some other way to get on television.” So they were pretty responsive to that. Now, I mean, it's always been our philosophy—early on we decided that one of the flaws we saw in the Dukakis campaign was that they tried to run a real top-down campaign. You know, they knew best—all these kids from Boston that went into these states—they knew best, they had all the answers. They had their little charts and their little maps, and they were going to tell you how to win a race in your state that they had never been to before. And we decided we weren't going to do that. All we had to do to win was to hire local people who had won races in their states before and then help them do what they knew how to do. In Georgia we turned our campaign over to Sam Nunn's guy. In Louisiana we turned it over to John Breaux.

DB: You take the risk of whatever political enemies . . .

CS: Absolutely. And you've got to worry about that, and in some states we didn't make the right connect, but generally it works.

DB: Is that true now? I thought most of our field directors were out of the Clinton campaign.

CS: Dukakis—over half of his state directors in 1988 came out of Massachusetts. We have, besides Mary Anne Salmon who runs Arkansas, one other state has a field director from Arkansas. That's state director. Of the fifty states, only one of the press secretaries is from Arkansas. And of the fifty states, only one of the political directors is from Arkansas.

DB: But how many . . . ?

CS: Are from the states that they're working? Half. Half of them are local.

DB: And are all those in targeted states or not?

CS: Well, it's about 50-50.

DB: Okay. Now, explain to me, because you say a state director or a political director or press director, what is the hierarchy out there?

CS: The state director runs the show. Every state got a state director and a press secretary. The bigger states got a third person. Some states it was a field director and some states it was a political director, depending on what exactly they needed. But that's all the Clinton staff we have in any state, is three. Three paid staff. And their job is to get on TV every night.

DB: And they're all tied in, as I understand it, on e-mail so they get the talking points and the schedules? Is that innovative? I mean, was that true with Dukakis?

CS: I've never seen anybody—we can move a document three minutes—every statement, they're going to have it within three minutes by computer. And if you want to move it on hard paper, every state in the country could have it in eight minutes by broadcast fax. So it's easy to stay on message because we're giving them the message every couple of hours. We move five or six press releases a day out there, then the states have the options of which ones they want to do. Doing something on the environment isn't probably the best political move in West Virginia, so they don't do that one, they do something else. They do something that they got last week that they didn't use last week.

DB: Exporting jobs?

CS: That's right. So it works like that. Mexico Free Trade, that's something we want to talk a lot about in Texas—Michigan, it's not so hot an idea, so we push a lot of stuff out of the office on a daily basis and give the states options. What do you want to move today? You know, you want to move AID? Here's AID. The other innovative thing we've done that's helped with that is the way we set up the in-office field department. Generally in campaigns in the past, Democratic campaigns, there's been a field department that had four or five desk people, and all they worried about was field. They had a separate political department with political desks, and all they worried about was politics. They had a political operation that had four or five desk people. They had regional issue desks, but they all worked in different parts of the building—the political people worked under the political director, issues people worked under the issues director, press people worked under the press director. What we've done is collapsed all that into one system. The in-state political person

sits right next to the in-state field person who sits right next to the regional press person who sits right next to the regional issues person. They all sit there as a group, which can really help you. We decide that politically we want to send a message about health care. Well, the regional press secretary then calls all the state press secretaries and says, “We’re moving this health care piece.” The regional issues person says, “I can localize all those health care statistics to a state-by-state basis and then give them to the Press Secretary and get them out to the states.” Then the political person’s on the phone going, “Governor, will you stand up and do this press conference for us?” So, I mean, it all rolls for message. It’s just a message machine is what we have, and it’s worked very effectively. Now the most interesting thing about this campaign is that the Republicans haven’t done it, and we assumed that they would. They’ve relied very heavily—I think this may have been one of the flaws—they’ve relied very heavily on use of surrogates, that’s what they do. We use kids out there who get on TV, and they use cabinet members.

DB: Well, surely cabinet members get TV.

CS: Well they get on TV, but here’s the difference—none of the candidates want to run with Bush and we’re rolling out congressmen. They built their free-press strategy around surrogates and they can’t get any other than cabinet members, and it rings real hollow because they know their job’s on the line. You know, we use governors, senators, congressmen. We assumed that we wouldn’t have them, because Democrats have never had them in the past.

DB: Right, in Arkansas, everybody was on vacation when Mondale came in.

CS: Right. So we assumed from the beginning that we wouldn't have them. So we sent out kids, and said, "Look, kids, you're getting on TV." They never set up a similar operation because they've always had the surrogates and this time they didn't have them. So their entire free-media operation was wiped out.

DB: Well, let me ask you something. What above all, Craig, has made this campaign so effective?

CS: I think part of it is our ability to focus on the message. Simon Rosenberg is my communications guy. He kept sending memos to the state saying, "I want your in-state wedge issues. What are the wedge issues?" And the states were never responding. Simon said, "By God, I'd fire them all. Just fire them all. They're not responding to my memo." Finally we realized why they weren't responding. We have the ultimate wedge issue—the economy. Nothing is more important than that. You don't need to talk about it. George Bush needs wedge issues because he can't talk about the economy. We don't need them. People's jobs are the ultimate wedge issue. So, because the issue that determined the outcome of this election was so pervasive, it was easy to stay on message. The message was the economy.

DB: Do you remember when it was that it dawned on everybody that it was the economy?

CS: It was gradual, but it played in our favor big-time.

DB: Was it New Hampshire? Where the pain was so evident? Or was it before then?

CS: But at the time we all thought, "Now that's just a New Hampshire deal." It was just a gradual thing. You remember in the New Covenant speeches we talked about foreign policy, and it didn't matter.

DB: And responsibility.

CS: Unity and service. It was the economy.

DB: Was that Carville, or was that . . . ?

CS: I think it was Carville. Carville has always—it's my understanding, from his previous races in finding people to work with him—it is always his theory that if you say, "I'm running on this ten-point platform," nobody will remember it. But if you say, "I'm running on this one-point platform," everybody will remember it.

DB: Like health care.

CS: That's right. And that's what he tried to do. And I think Carville helped us condense that message. So I think that may be one of the reasons we were effective is because we're not all over the map talking about fifty-seven different things. We talk about them, but it's one issue. So it's easy to stay focused when you've only got one thing to focus on. So that's one. The second reason I think is because of the dynamic of this race, you know, the people that were here in January, February—in the dark days of the campaign. I used to tell my staff—I remember December and we were just flying high. We gave a speech to the state chairs. I kept saying, "Look, folks, remember, this campaign will have good days and it'll have bad days. Enjoy the good days because the bad days will really suck." And did they ever. But I think because of that, there was a certain—you know, bonding sounds so hokey—but I think there's a certain cohesiveness to people here just because anybody who has suffered through that—I remember the days at the headquarters where it was like, Are we going to be around another hour, or do we go down to Buster's and start drinking?

DB: I remember the night David Pryor came by and just physically almost picked people up off the floor.

CS: It was not pretty, but to have survived that, you know, it makes you stronger. Wasn't it Nietzsche who said, "What doesn't kill me makes me strong"? And I think it made us strong. Like the recent Gennifer Flowers thing; there's a *Penthouse* nude pictorial of a woman who's going to come out and who said that your candidate made her pregnant and she had an abortion. I mean in most campaigns, you have to remember Joe Biden dropped out because . . .

DB: He used somebody else's words.

CS: That's right. And around our headquarters it was, like, no problem. And I think it's that kind of thing.

DB: When you read these press accounts of this awesome Clinton organization—we've agreed that on message it's centralized—but where does the centralization, where does the organization come from?

CS: I think—and this is a discussion Bill Clinton and I had, you know, back when Betsey left the governor's office. There are two kinds of management styles. You can either have decisions made by one central point, and the advantages of that are—it's like the difference between a democracy and a dictatorship. A dictator can make decisions pretty fast and everybody follows them. The question is, are they the best decisions? If they're not, you've still got them. Or, you can have this kind of consensus thing. You probably get better decisions, it just takes a little while longer to get them.

DB: And it may be messy on the way.

CS: That's right. So the question is, which way do you want to go? This campaign—the Bush campaign is James Baker. Theirs is definitely the autocratic style. This is the opposite. But what's good around here is that once a decision is made, everybody says, “Okay.” You know, we'll sit there and fight about it for two or three days—I'm on this side and I'm on that side—but once the decision is made, everybody falls in line and says, “That's it.” I don't know who made it and there's twenty people up there and nobody ultimately was responsible for it, but once it was made, it's done. And everybody influenced it.

DB: Do you also get a feeling that this looseness in a way has encouraged creativity and initiative? Has that been your experience?

CS: Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, it just does. You know, you've got very bright people here. I've got a guy, works for me, he's twenty-nine, has produced, written and directed a television special that aired on the Turner Network. These are very bright people here. So you don't want to—you know, too many campaigns have a management style where you just suppress people, “We don't care what you say, we make the decisions, we tell you what they are, you do them.” We don't do that, and the response is a lot of creativity. And I think that's what's also helped us out in the field. Like the chicken—I mean, that was just nuts—and a guy came up with it. And then it just exploded. Everyone was going, “Hey, let's see if that works for my state.” We have whole meetings where we just talk about what works, what doesn't work.

DB: But insofar as targeting, who gets the cream of the crop—where the money goes? Who ultimately decides? Is that Wilhelm?

CS: No, I mean, that's another collective decision. You know, when it started out for state targeting, me and Michael Whouley sat down in June and said, "Here's a list of states we want to play." And I think we picked out 380 electoral votes. And then Wilhelm got in with all his gurus and then the people upstairs and James, and Stanley comes in with all his polls and Greer comes in with all this. And now the targeting meetings have, like, fifty people in them. But of those 380 electoral votes we originally picked, 373 of them are still in play. The targeting meeting now—we have them twice a week generally—we have fifty people in them. "Do we keep playing Alabama or do we pull out of Alabama? Do we go up on Montana, do we sit down on Montana?" I mean, that's how it is. It's a consensus. It's a constant reevaluation.

DB: How often do you do the reevaluation?

CS: Twice a week. Every Sunday at five . . .

DB: And on the basis of polling data, field reports, what the other camp is doing?

CS: That's right. What Ross Perot is doing. What Bush is doing. What we think our odds are. Historical voting patterns. What our polls show in there. What kind of infrastructure we have to back it up. We look at, is there a senate candidate we want to help there? Is there a gubernatorial we want to help there, that if we go in, it may pull somebody else across? And then there's a lot of just seat-of-the-pants, "oh, well who needs South Dakota"? No, we want South Dakota. They're actually pretty funny.

DB: So a really die-hard, determined, effective, persuasive state director might be able to persuade you to put something more into his state?

CS: Right. It happens all the time. I mean, it's not even the state directors. It's like the governors call me, "If we just have one stop in Oklahoma, we can win Oklahoma." "If you just move \$10,000 into Idaho, you can really make an impact." That's what I spend most of my time doing right now because governors, senators, senate candidates, congressmen calling, or state chairmen. "If you could just move me \$100,000 more into Texas."

DB: You must really be getting hit hard by Texas.

CS: They don't even call anymore. I spent months getting beat up by it, and I held them off. I mean, that's my job. They went around me.

DB: Oh, they went every place they could go. They must have the Clinton phone book and were calling everybody they could get.

CS: And as soon as they realized they could go around me, and I would say, "No," and they'd go around me and other people would say, "Yes," they quit calling me.

DB: Now I've just got four quick questions. What was your low point?

CS: Gennifer Flowers.

DB: And your high point?

CS: Super Tuesday.

DB: When in your own mind were you convinced Bill Clinton was going to be the nominee?

CS: March 3. Georgia. I knew if we could win Georgia we'd win South Carolina and we'd roll Super Tuesday. Georgia was the key, and I knew after we won Georgia, it was done because we would build up such an insurmountable delegate lead nobody could come back and beat us.

DB: Kerrey was still beating up on us in Georgia, wasn't he?

CS: Oh, yes. Harkin was, too. And then Harkin outspent us ten to one in South Carolina on that Saturday. You know, Georgia was on Tuesday and South Carolina was on Saturday. He outspent us ten to one there, and we beat him there, and he was done.

DB: When did you become convinced that Bill Clinton would be president?

CS: Can I give two answers? The first time was in April of 1991 in Carbondale, Illinois. We flew up there to give a Southern Illinois Democratic Unity Dinner speech. And we went up there and Alan Dixon was there and Paul Simon, and we worked the crowds. This is after we had given the DLC speech. I don't know exactly. After we had given the DLC speech, but before we had even really thought about doing it. And then we set up an interview on this television station afterwards. And I heard Bill Clinton speak—and I've heard him speak a thousand times probably—and I just sat there and I was dumbfounded. It gave me chills. And after it was done and we did the TV interview and we got back in the plane—it was just him and me on this trip—I looked at him and I said, “You know, I'm sitting here next to the next president of the United States. And it makes me feel weird. Because, after hearing that speech, it's going to be hard for me to look at you the same way that I have on all these other trips that we've done across the country.” And he didn't say anything. And I couldn't even tell if he was flattered and didn't know what to say, or if he thought, “I can't believe he has so little faith in me.” But I just said, “It's giving me chills sitting here thinking I'm sitting next to the next president of the United States.” That was the first time. When did I absolutely think he'd win it? After the second debate—the second presidential debate—last Thursday. George Bush had to beat us

two out of three in the debates. He didn't beat us the first one and he didn't beat us the second one. And one out of three wasn't enough to win it for him. Not only did he not win it, we creamed it. At that point it was over.

DB: One more question. Looking at the future, looking at posterity, what would you most want people to know about this campaign?

CS: I guess I would say two things. The first is that we never gave up. When there were lots of chances to give up, and where probably sane people would give up, we didn't give up. And the second would be—some people like to look at politics like it's a chess match, you know, you move this piece, we move that piece, you move this piece. And that's all well and good and you need people like that involved in the campaign, but politics is also like a street fight, and you need people like that involved, too. It's the combination of both of them that makes sure you win.

[End of Interview]

[Reviewed and edited by Pryor Center staff]